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Now then the father of all issued as a mighty Wheel; the Sphinx, and the dog-headed god, and Typhon, were bound on his circumference.
-- Aleister Crowley
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Los |
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Post subject: Crowley on Knowledge
 Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 04:28 PM
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Joined: Nov 02, 2008
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Location: NY
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This is going to be a moderately long post, as there is some groundwork I want to lay first. I'm still working through some of my thoughts on this issue, and I welcome comments on any of these musings, particularly from those who are of the opinion that knowledge is impossible.
A thread that was locked the other day -- the one titled "93" in the introductions section -- was beginning to delve into an interesting point: Crowley's perspective on "knowledge." I'd like to examine these ideas a little more closely.
In several works, Crowley argues, essentially, that knowledge is impossible on the grounds that all statements can be reduced to S = P. Thus, all statements can be represented as tautologies that convey no knowledge. For example, the statement "a cat has four legs" can be reduced to "a furry animal with four legs is an animal with four legs." Therefore, runs this argument, knowledge is impossible, and knowledge and reason are self-defeating.
Of course, it should be noted that Crowley is sharp enough to realize -- as he does in Little Essays Towards Truth -- that the statement "There is no such thing as knowledge" can also be reduced to S = P, invalidating this very "proof" against knowledge (in other words, by the logic of this argument, we can't even know that we can't know anything).
Crowley's essential position -- though not his exact argument -- was invoked by Ianrons on the closed thread. Ian writes: "knowledge of things leads one to question those very things [...] which then leads on to other things that make us question whether we really know anything at all, including necessarily the original supposed 'knowledge' [...] [it] doesn't say anything about true "knowledge" in an objective sense."
The antagonist of the locked thread, Erwin Hessle, points out that this Crowleyan/Rons-easque critique of knowledge criticizes knowledge on false grounds -- i.e. on a false understanding of what "knowledge" actually is. Erwin writes: "This 'true knowledge' of which you speak bears absolutely no relation to actual knowledge in the real world. It's an entirely imaginary concept which philosophers have invented, apparently for the sole purpose of arguing over. These philosophers are defining 'knowledge' in a way that they think it should be, instead of looking at actual knowledge in the real world and try to reason about that."
As an illustration of the point Erwin is making, consider the fact that everyone knows the difference between a cat and an apple (and can demonstrate that knowledge). Whatever we might say about knowledge, it certainly appears to be possible. One does not need "true knowledge in the objective sense" in order to possess knowledge of some things. This observation, of course, renders "true knowledge in the objective sense" -- if it even exists -- completely useless for all practical purposes.
In short, when someone says, "Gaining knowledge of something leads us to wonder whether we have true knowledge of anything at all," that person is talking about two different things, but using a single word ("knowledge") to label them both. The one kind of knowledge is the real kind: the kind we mean when we say, "I know the bus comes every day at 9:30." The other kind of knowledge is the imaginary kind: the imagination of knowledge as a big tautology that cannot give us "true knowledge." Of course, the fact that one can use word games to deconstruct the imaginary knowledge (i.e. knowledge in the second sense) does not mean that "there is no such thing as knowledge" (i.e. knowledge in the first sense).
What's the problem with all of this? The problem is that on the basis of these logical flaws, people can attempt to deprecate actual knowledge or reason. As an example, the poster of the original thread started to claim that he has never found knowledge to be useful and instead decides to go with what he has experienced and what his heart tells him.
More to the point, these attempts to deprecate reason or knowledge often lead to attempts to ignore legitimate skeptical inquiry into the nature of the universe. It's easy for a cascade of false conclusions to follow. For example: if knowledge is impossible, then no one has knowledge; if no one has knowledge, then any person is just as "knowledgeable" as the most respected scientists; if everyone is just as knowledgeable as everyone else, then any random (and batshit crazy) belief is just as much "knowledge" as anything else; if any random belief is knowledge, then anything can be and is true; if anything can be and is true, conclusions suggested by feelings are just as true as conclusions suggested by evidence-based inquiry. On the basis of ideas like these, a person can easily convince himself that he has "knowledge" that reincarnation is true or that souls exist or any number of similar beliefs that are unjustified by reason and cannot be demonstrated.
In other words, this one logical flaw and incorrect conclusion about knowledge quickly leads to an intellectual sludge. Rather than "transcending" the reason, the person in question ironically becomes victim to his own poor reasoning.
In fact, it seems apparent that knowledge is quite possible, that even if we can reduce a statement like "The bus comes at 9:30 each day" to an S = P statement, learning that statement consitutes actual knowledge.
What it really seems like is that Crowley's argument is a sort of deconstructionist, Derridean critique of language itself -- i.e. that language never points to an "ultimate signified" because words only ever signify other words, which signify other words, etc., etc. However, such a critique -- whatever its merits -- doesn't mean that "knowledge is impossible" or that there isn't truth. Deconstructionist critique relies on the existence of truth and knowledge, since without truth and knowledge, its own claims would be rendered pointless (and, as I pointed out earlier, the claim "knowledge is impossible" would be rendered false).
It seems to me that knowledge and reason aren't impossible or flawed so much as they are insufficient for accomplishing the task of discovering the true will. Reason is to be "transcended" to the extent that it cannot be used to directly discover the will, nor can the images of the mind substitute themselves for will. But the task of discovering the will cannot proceed properly without a clear understanding of one's environment, a clear understanding of the universe outside of oneself. Reason is not capable of discovering the will, but it *is* capable of allowing us to come to reliable conclusions about the world around us. A failure to observe the flaws in one's reasoning -- often exacerbated by misguided attempts to ignore the reason altogether -- can quickly lead to false conclusions about the world that will lead one astray. |
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Erwin |
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Post subject: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 05:39 PM
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Joined: Feb 15, 2007
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Los wrote: › Of course, it should be noted that Crowley is sharp enough to realize -- as he does in Little Essays Towards Truth -- that the statement "There is no such thing as knowledge" can also be reduced to S = P, invalidating this very "proof" against knowledge (in other words, by the logic of this argument, we can't even know that we can't know anything).
Crowley's essential position -- though not his exact argument -- was...
I think it's important to point out that this is an "essential position" of Crowley's, rather than the "essential position" of his. Crowley was himself perfectly aware of the problems with this position as well. For instance, in The Solider and the Hunchback, published way back in 1909, he said (emphasis added):
"The Christian insists on notorious lies being accepted as an essential part of his (more usually her) system; I, on the contrary, ask for facts, for observation. Under Scepticism, true, one is just as much a house of cards as the other; but only in the philosophical sense.
"Practically, Science is true; and Faith is foolish.
"Practically, 3 * 1 = 3 is the truth; and 3 * 1 = 1 is a lie; though, sceptically, both statements may be false or unintelligible.
"Practically, Franklin's method of obtaining fire from heaven is better than that of Prometheus or Elijah. I am now writing by the light that Franklin’s discovery enabled men to use...
"...I claim nothing absolute from my Samadhi - I know only too well the worthlessness of single-handed observations, even on so simple a matter as a boiling-point determination! - and as for his (usually her) future, I content myself with mere common sense about the probable end of a fool."
These folks who attempt to argue that Crowley was advocating a "balance" between reason and lack of it simply haven't read enough of him, because it's a total misrepresentation of his position.
I applaud the sanity and positive spirit in which your post is offered, and I think we need more that around here, but I will refrain from commenting on the rest of it, since I think I've already made my position on the matter clear enough in other threads here, and I don't want to distract from responses to your own points.
Los wrote: › What's the problem with all of this? The problem is that on the basis of these logical flaws, people can attempt to deprecate actual knowledge or reason. As an example, the poster of the original thread started to claim that he has never found knowledge to be useful and instead decides to go with what he has experienced and what his heart tells him.
If I, as a member of the Aleister Crowley Society, may be so bold as to offer my own opinions on that Society and the resources available to it, I think what you've described here has polluted the forums to a shameful level, and really needs to end.
There are some people here who seriously advocate a "balance" between "rationality" and irrationality when it comes to discussing these subjects. In the very thread you cite, someone seriously tried to argue that it was "against his Will" to "indulge in an excess of reason". In no field other than religion and occultism - which I don't consider to be real fields at all - would any serious participant actually advocate approaching their subject in an irrational way, and further, go on to point out that knowledge and reason are actual impediments to understanding their subject.
When people make outrageous claims - I remember one in a past thread where one poster was claiming to have had an actual honest-to-goodness street fight with an actual honest-to-goodness demon - those claims should be vigorously challenged, not allowed to pass out of a misguided sense of politeness. In reality, what more often happens is that certain elements of the posting membership actually try to censure such challenges, apparently on the grounds that there's no such thing as reality, that "reason" is some kind of handicap, and that pretending to have street-fights with demons is just as "valid" a way of approaching reality as any other.
This is an absolutely obnoxious and contemptible attitude which I think is going to be fatal to any serious attempt to assess, examine, and appreciate the legacy of Aleister Crowley, and fatal to any serious attempt to do anything else, for that matter. I think this kind of attitude does a grave disservice to the membership of the Aleister Crowley Society and to its objectives, and it is my view that anybody actually interested in the Society and its objectives would consider themselves to have a collective responsibility to eradicate it on these forums wherever it is found. I shudder to think how some of what passes for discussion on these forums must look to an objective outsider who stumbles across it.
It is not appropriate in any sane and sensible circles to advocate a "balance" between approaching the subject in a rational and factual way, and approaching the subject in an irrational, make-believe, and grossly misleading and distorting way. One should strive for the former all the time when involved in the discussion of Aleister Crowley's legacy or in any other discussion. |
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wolf354 |
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Post subject: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 06:17 PM
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Joined: Jan 17, 2006
Posts: 306
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Los wrote: › ...
93,
Same words and different meanings/definitions can be a mess.
What I've found helpful to me was to read about clear definitions from the Tree of Life, and in this particular case a deeper study of Chokmah, Chesed and Daath might help you to draw conclusions, though I wonder if you will be disposed to share them.
There is always the trap of because ...
Best regards,
[edit] not Chesed but Binah ... my apologies for not revieweing my message before posting. |
_________________
Be thou therefore prompt and active as the Sylphs, but avoid frivolity and caprice; be energetic and strong like the Salamanders, but avoid irritability and ferocity; be flexible and attentive to images like the Undines, but avoid idleness and changeabili
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alysa |
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Post subject: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 06:27 PM
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Joined: Jul 09, 2008
Posts: 465
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| Los wrote "so many things". |
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Autotelos |
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Post subject: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 06:52 PM
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Joined: Feb 26, 2010
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I think the reference to Derrida is useful, and should perhaps be analyzed a little deeper. The first fallacy you describe is not necessarily a critique of knowledge but of language. That is, the symbol cat only carries negative information; this is not a dog, not a lion, not a table, etc. The problem Derrida ran into though, is that we can never escape language, which I think can be broadened into a neat theological argument, in the beginning was logos, and all that. It also fits in with the use of symbols in the occult, focusing the mind on correlations of ideas through symbols to eventually allow oneself to transcend those.
I also feel that the most prominent disagreements on the boards lately aren't a case of reason vs irrationality, though there has been some of that. Its a question of the appropriate epistemology for understanding on the one hand, Crowley's life and legacy, and on the other, a broader understanding of thelema specificallyy and the occult in general.
While I agree that there needs to be a consensus understanding of reality, I feel it is just that, a need not a preexistence. Binocular vision, language, the concept of zero, the concept of History, of Ethics, these are things which contribute to our understanding of the world we live in and are necessary to the way we live in modern society. Assuming gravity will always work, using mathemetical formulae, assuming the electron cloud works like we think it should. These assumed fictions help us create actual beneficial technology by relying on a really good and sound theory.
Which is why I also see the typhonian point that fictions can be as useful as facts for metaphysical, psychological, occult, whatever, kind of workings. If you want the system to be sound, you have to accept certain fictions and I would argue that this is the same as the "real" world. |
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Los |
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Post subject: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 07:49 PM
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Joined: Nov 02, 2008
Posts: 443
Location: NY
Status: Offline
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wolf354 wrote: › There is always the trap of because ... There is. And that trap, as clearly explained in the Book of the Law -- as others have pointed out -- is that reason should not be used to discover the will. However, the Book of the Law does *not* ever say that reason should not be used to come to conclusions about the universe.
You can take Crowley's word for it if you like. From the New Comment: "We must not suppose for an instant that the Book of the Law is opposed to reason. On the contrary, its own claim to authority rests upon reason, and nothing else [...] It makes reason the autocrat of the mind."
I gave an example of poor reasoning in my first post that can lead to false conclusions ("I know souls exist"), which can very easily lead to actions taken on that basis -- a potential example of the trap of because.
Autotelos wrote: › The problem Derrida ran into though, is that we can never escape language, which I think can be broadened into a neat theological argument, in the beginning was logos, and all that. It also fits in with the use of symbols in the occult, focusing the mind on correlations of ideas through symbols to eventually allow oneself to transcend those. Well, Derrida did observe that there's no escaping language and that language can only be defined in terms of other language.
However, that critique is entirely apart from the observation that we can have knowledge. Whatever label I use for "cat," I have knowledge of what it is and can reliably identify things as cats. My knowledge also enables me to do things like distinguish cats from things that are not cats and to know how to take care of one (I know, for example, to feed it food and not rocks).
What you suggest here is that there are certain methods of "exhausting" the mind by means of connecting correspondences; by distracting the mind in this way, one can look past the mind and perceive the will.
This is completely separate from the point that knowledge exists.
Quote: › Assuming gravity will always work, using mathemetical formulae, assuming the electron cloud works like we think it should. These assumed fictions help us create actual beneficial technology by relying on a really good and sound theory. See, this is where we run into problems. You use the word "fiction" to label conclusions that we have derived from copious amounts of evidence, on the grounds (presumably) that we cannot be absolutely certain of these conclusions. Then you turn around and equate these conclusions with an entirely different kind of fiction, i.e. ones that are invented wholesale in the imagination and come from fantasy stories: Quote: › Which is why I also see the typhonian point that fictions can be as useful as facts for metaphysical, psychological, occult, whatever, kind of workings. Don't you see that you are talking about two completely different things and using one single label ("fiction") for both of them?
And, anyway, I wouldn't use "fiction" to describe assumptions like, for example, gravity will keep working tomorrow, except in the context of the most technical philosophical discussion (and keeping clear that it's an entirely different kind of "fiction" than something like a horror short story). I would describe our understanding that gravity will function tomorrow as knowledge, and the fact that we can't be absolutely certain about it doesn't make it any less knowledge.
Absolute certainty, in the way that some people describe it, doesn't seem to exist, so we can safely discard it for our purposes. |
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Los |
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Post subject: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 07:58 PM
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Joined: Nov 02, 2008
Posts: 443
Location: NY
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Erwin wrote: › There are some people here who seriously advocate a "balance" between "rationality" and irrationality when it comes to discussing these subjects. It's ironic -- a true balanced approach would advocate applying reason in those situations where reason is applicable (such as coming to conclusions about the universe) and not applying reason in those situations where reason is not applicable (such as experiencing sensations or observing the will).
To do otherwise is an imbalance. |
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Post subject: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 08:06 PM
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Joined: Mar 17, 2009
Posts: 482
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Los wrote: › a true balanced approach would advocate applying reason in those situations where reason is applicable (such as coming to conclusions about the universe)
Are you familiar with Descartes' Evil Demon hypothesis and, if yes, how does the statement "I think therefore I am" prove anything? As linguistics shows the singular personal pronoun "I" is an aspect of language and says nothing of real identity. So "who" is thinking and what does any of that prove? |
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ianrons |
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Post subject: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 08:08 PM
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Joined: Jul 02, 2004
Posts: 1175
Location: U.K.
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Los,
I’m going to provide a few different ways of looking at this question of “knowledge”, because it is an important question and one worth discussing. Firstly, however, I’d like to note that (as David Hume wrote) there is no need for anyone to be a philosopher, or to go beyond “I know what a cat is”, in life. The view of the philosopher is, however, different:
David Hume wrote: › In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe that fire warms, or water refreshes, ’tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise. Nay, if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner.
And there can be no doubt that philosophy can have no tolerable prospect of attaining “truth”; thus it may seem folly, and thus some would counsel against enquiring too deeply of what a cat is, should that lead us to discover that we really cannot know anything truly or to deny reason itself. Mathematics, too, leads us to all sorts of quandaries, with “imaginary” numbers and much stranger monsters of the deep. However, to refuse to assay these depths is to stay slumbering by the fireside – safe, perhaps; but sound?
To go back to what Erwin has said about knowledge, I’ll paste a couple of quotes:
Erwin wrote: › It is not necessary to know everything in order to know something.
The traditional misunderstanding of the occultist, which holds that because “reason is imperfect” that “nothing can be known”, or that “knowledge is impossible”, is instantly revealed to be nonsense. As a simple demonstration, ask yourself the following two questions:
1.Do you know, beyond any shadow of a doubt, the position and velocity of every particle in the universe at the current time, and the complete set of laws that govern them, such that you can deduce – with 100% accuracy – the precise positions and velocities of all the particles of the universe at any given time in the past or future that you choose? and
2.Do you know what 2 + 2 equals?
If you answered “no” to question 1, and “yes” to question 2, then you have demonstrated to yourself that it’s not necessary to know everything in order to know something
Erwin wrote: › I can put two photographs in front of you, one a photograph of a cat, and one a photograph of the space shuttle. Now you will - I'm giving you the benefit of the doubt - be able to reliably identify which is which. That is, you can correctly identify a photograph of a cat as a photograph of a cat, and you can correctly identify a photograph of the space shuttle as a photograph of the space shuttle.
Do you need to know what a cat "really is" to have this knowledge? Do you need to know what a space shuttle "really is"? No, you don't. All you have to be able to do is to reliably assemble a collection of various impressions into a composite that legitimately goes along with the label "cat". You don't have to know everything in order to know something. You don't have to have knowledge of some "fundamental essence of a cat" in order to be able to correctly identify a cat, and to have confidence that you have, in fact, correctly identified it.
I think these “demonstrations” are pretty close to being appeals to gut instinct. “Don’t look into the abyss of philosophy!”, they seem to say. And yes, in our experience of the world, a cat certainly seems to be a cat, or to put it more philosophically, our impression of a cat fits our idea of that class of things under the label “cat”. But there are a few different ways of critiquing this which I shall now elaborate.
Firstly, just to kick things off, “dream argument” (from Descartes, after Plato). If, in a dream, one sees a cat, is it a cat? Certainly we can interact with it in much the same way as we would if awake. It can appear like a very real cat, according to how clearly one dreams; but this raises questions about the wake-world, and might make us ponder whether we are right simply to accept that we “know” what a cat is. It might be a figment of our imagination, or maybe a collective imagination, as it was in the dream. Maybe it’s correct, but maybe there’s a better form of knowledge. Are we correct, then to accept Erwin’s “knowledge” of a cat and refuse to go further? There seem to be prima facie grounds for thinking perhaps not.
But moving for a moment to cover the basics, what happens if we do question what a cat actually is? We run into difficulties quite soon. You might say that a cat is a mammal. So what is a mammal? An animal. Part of the universe. But what is the universe? By enquiring in this way, we run out of generalizations. We could look at it in a slightly different way, and say that a cat is composed of fur, claws, flesh, bone, etc., all of which are composed of different chemicals which are themselved composed of atoms, quarks, gluons and what-not, till eventually we can no longer analyse a cat. In short, we have a chain of links that (skipping slightly the full proof) lead us to the conclusion that we don’t really know what a cat is, and moreover that we can’t possibly know what a cat (or indeed anything) is. Following this process, we are eventually led to the the view that neither can we know reason itself, whether it be true – and here Crowley said “It is forbidden to him to seek any refuge from his intellect. Let then his reason hurl itself again and again against the blank wall of mystery which will confront him.”
But that’s if you use reason to analyse what knowledge-of-a-cat is. Erwin forbids it, apparently seeking refuge from his intellect. However, there is a problem. In his “demonstration” that we can know what a cat is, even this process of fitting the photograph of a cat into a general idea of “cat” is a process of the intellect. Sometimes it is imperceptible, but there can also be occasions when one struggles to identify a face, showing us that something is taking place in the mind to allow us to make that identification. Is this some type of reason, of the type used in philosophy (he describes it as “loosely rational”)? I would argue that both are functions of the mind, even if differing slightly in what regions of the brain are used. Perhaps he regards the faculty that identifies photos as superior to other types of (presumably “stricter”) reason; but on what grounds? He doesn’t seem to offer any, and in fact in one of his essays he asks the reader who doesn’t simply accept his “demonstration” to stop reading. I find this approach highly anti-intellectual (certainly anti-philosophical), and I would say not that “[‘true knowledge’ is] an entirely imaginary concept which philosophers have invented”, but rather that this sort of “knowledge” is nothing more than a convenient fiction, and a self-contradictory one.
I should note also that Erwin does state clearly his belief that reason is reliable, such as when commenting on his belief that Gödel “affirms the reliability of reason”, so more generally there does seem to be a real problem with refusing certain types of reasoning, such as the argument against knowledge, whilst allowing others. It seems to be an entirely utilitarian kind of philosophy, opposed to (quoting Sir William Hamilton) “every philosopher of every school” (with the exception of “a few late Absolutist theorisers in Germany”). In fact it seems more like a form of pedagogy. |
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Hecate |
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Post subject:
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 08:11 PM
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Posts: 341
Location: Athens, Greece
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Greetings!
What an interesting topic Los!
Would you identify knowledge with experience?
Regards
Hecate |
_________________
666
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Los |
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Post subject: Re: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 08:26 PM
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Joined: Nov 02, 2008
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ianrons wrote: › If, in a dream, one sees a cat, is it a cat? No, it's a dream of a cat. You just said so yourself.
Quote: › this raises questions about the wake-world, and might make us ponder whether we are right simply to accept that we “know” what a cat is. It might be a figment of our imagination, or maybe a collective imagination, as it was in the dream. What you're proposing here is a version of the silly "brain in a vat" thought experiment: "What if everything I perceive is an illusion created by a mad scientist and my reality is actually the matrix?"
This thought experiment fails because *even if it were true* -- and there's no indication that it is -- it does not change the fact that we have knowledge.
It might, I admit, be true that I'm a brain in a vat. It might also be true that the universe was created last Tuesday by pixies, complete with false memories of things that happened before last Tuesday. It might also be that I'm in an insane asylum right now dreaming all of this. It might also be that I'm a butterfly dreaming that I'm a man.
All of the above is completely and totally irrelevant to knowledge. There's no good reason to suppose that any of the above hypothetical situations are, in fact, true, but even if they were true, it doesn't change the fact that the reality I experience -- whatever its nature -- is something about which I can gain knowledge.
And that's the point here. Whatever the nature of reality is, it's something about which we can gain knowledge.
You have invented a completely different kind of knowledge that relies on us knowing the "true reality" of something. That kind of knowledge -- a made up, fantasy idea of knowledge that bears no relation to what everybody else means by the word -- is both impossible and irrelevant to the fact that I can know what a cat is and how to take care of one. |
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Post subject: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 08:28 PM
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Joined: Mar 17, 2009
Posts: 482
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Ian - to reduce your arguments down to a few observations.
Our inability to directly know what something “is” via reason or language is a fundamental state of reality, consistent with many root-theorems of world religions and Platonic idealism – namely reality lies in the realm of ideals/Supernals rather than the world of appearances/below the Abyss.
In between these two realms lies Knowledge. The tautological and limited nature of Knowledge does not mean one should throw reason out the window, but rather recognize the limitations of the intellect in apprehending Being. We can certainly apprehend this via direct intuition and understanding, but not through attempts to reason our way there – unless, of course, our reasoning follows the Socratic method of questioning and path of negation. |
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Post subject: Re: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 08:33 PM
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Joined: Mar 17, 2009
Posts: 482
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Los wrote: › is both impossible and irrelevant to the fact that I can know what a cat is and how to take care of one.
Los - you're using "knowledge" in a sense different from Daath - or what Crowley is refers to as Knowledge in Little Essays. |
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ianrons |
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Post subject: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 08:36 PM
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Joined: Jul 02, 2004
Posts: 1175
Location: U.K.
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Los,
I brought up the dream argument simply to loosen the valves up a bit -- I fully realise it doesn't imply anything, which is why I used the word "maybe" a couple of times, and the word "perhaps"; but my main arguments you have not addressed. I'd like to hear your views on those.
tai,
I am certainly not arguing for throwing reason out of the window -- in fact, quite the reverse. It seems to be that Erwin's position is opposed to reason, in that whilst he seems willing to accept that reason leads to paradoxes and problems, he prefers not to worry about those and simply take a pragmatic approach to everyday life. The same kinds of arguments were made against "imaginary" numbers too; but imaginary numbers turn out to be useful in the real world (and quite fundamental in quantum physics).
Then again, I am not arguing that reason tells us reality -- in fact, I think the very contradictions it presents show us that cannot be so.
I am not quite sure whether we are in agreement on those points or not. |
Last edited by ianrons on Mar 18, 2010 - 08:38 PM; edited 1 time in total
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Post subject:
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 08:36 PM
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Hecate wrote: › Greetings!
What an interesting topic Los!
Would you identify knowledge with experience?
Regards
Hecate No, "knowledge" is a rational extrapolation from evidence. Experience can comprise evidence, but we cannot equate experience to knowledge.
For example, I can have the experience of seeing a magician pull a rabbit out of a hat, but I can also know that I'm observing an illusion being performed for my entertainment. Furthermore, I can have the experience of a dream (or a scrying session or something) and know that the experience was generated entirely by my mind and that the entities I saw (whether dream cats or spooky demons) don't exist outside of my mind.
Experience is part of the evidence we take into account when coming to rational conclusions (knowledge) about something. It should be obvious that a personal experience of voices in the head is not evidence of god talking to you. Experience, all by itself, does not yield knowledge. Experience always has to be interpreted by the reason -- which is why ignoring reason can lead you to make rational mistakes, and come to false conclusions like, "My experience proves that reincarnation is real."
Just to be clear, "know" doesn't mean "100% absolutely certain with no chance of error." Knowledge is always tentative, based on the best evidence we have. As we gain more evidence, we refine our knowledge.
tai wrote: › recognize the limitations of the intellect in apprehending Being. We can certainly apprehend this via direct intuition and understanding, but not through attempts to reason our way there
The statement that "intellect is limited in apprehending Being" is a conclusion, and as such, you must have reached it via reason. "Intuition" cannot produce rational conclusions.
I have to apologize -- I will be away from the internet for a few hours. I will field any new posts after that time. |
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Post subject:
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 08:51 PM
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Well, it looks like I have a few minutes before I have to go, so I'll field one more now. I suppose this is what Ian means by his argument (and correct me if I'm wrong):
Quote: › what happens if we do question what a cat actually is? If we question what a cat "actually" is (using your peculiar definition of "actually"), we define a cat by a number of terms that are defined by other terms that are defined by other terms and on and on and on and on. Exactly as you explained.
But that has nothing to do with the fact that "cat" is a label for a certain part of our experience. We don't need to rigorously define every aspect of our experience and engage in the circular dance to know a cat from a stick. As Erwin was trying to get you to see, that's not how knowledge actually works. We don't acquire knowledge by working from dictionaries and proceeding from definitions. We label parts of our experience -- that's what knowledge is, at its most basic level.
There are two kinds of "knowledge" under discussion here. One is the practical, real world knowledge. The other is "actual knowledge" or "true knowledge," which is an imaginary construct that has nothing to do with the other kind of knowledge. You can't criticize the former on the grounds of the latter.
And you certainly cannot turn around and then declare that there's no such thing as knowledge and that any random belief is just as much knowledge as any evidence-based conclusion.
More to come later. |
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Post subject:
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 09:12 PM
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Thanks Los,
As it seems from your final sentence, you haven't yet got to the main arguments I was making, but I look forward to hearing your views on those.
Re: the label "cat", this is addressed by Russell, and I can come back to that if necessary; but I would rather stick to the points I have already made, to keep it simple.
As regards the idea that that there are two different kinds of knowledge, I do not see this as a necessary step in my argumentation, or yours. If you think it is, then please make the case for it. Otherwise I think it is better that we simply use the term "knowledge".
Lastly, I am not saying that there's no such thing as knowledge, merely that it seems impossible to pin it down. It seems Erwin and yourself wish to pin it down somehow, but I don't think that's possible. |
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Post subject: Re: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 09:13 PM
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Autotelos wrote: › Which is why I also see the typhonian point that fictions can be as useful as facts for metaphysical, psychological, occult, whatever, kind of workings. If you want the system to be sound, you have to accept certain fictions and I would argue that this is the same as the "real" world.
I find it ironic in the extreme that the Typhonians find such meaning in MAAT - the Egyptian cosmic principle of order and truth. To the ancient Egyptians - the order of the universe was everywhere apprehendible in nature around them - and so were the two truths of Maat; The order of the outer universe as well as the inner order and truth of the indivisible light and life.
M.A.A.T is of every Aeon. Those that take only one half of her truth and place her on a pedestal know her NOT. And this is no little thing - for in this Aeon it is proclaimed in the unity of Liber Cheth:
13. Yea! verily this is the Truth, this is the Truth, this is the Truth.*(*) Unto thee shall be granted joy and health and wealth and wisdom when thou are no longer thou.
When we study the Egyptian Mysteries then the essential funeral role of the goddess was personified in the Merti - the eyes of Ma'at, even as she was the eye of Ra. In the Hall of the two horizons, the Merti await by the door - representing the two truths of inner and outer order and rightousness.
And Crowley wote: "As men multiplied, the frailty of man necessitated an exterior society which veiled the interior one, and concealed the spirit and the truth in the letter, because many people were not capable of comprehending great interior truth. Therefore, interior truths were wrapped in external and perceptible ceremonies, so that men, by the perception of the outer which is the symbol of the interior, might by degrees be enabled safely to approach the
interior spiritual truths.
But for those that do comprehend the interior truth of Ma'at, this is not what we find in Grant's writings. Instead we find disorder, and no essential interior truth that is reveiled in symbolic form for the aspirant.
We find - to quote Crowley again: "...the difference between the madman and the genius is not in the quantity but in the quality of their work. Genius is organized, madness chaotic....Disorder is always a parody of order, because there is no archetypal disorder that it might resemble. Owen Seaman can parody a poet; nobody can parody Owen Seaman.'
There is no inner truth that shines from Grant's work in light and life. He stands alone in his madness and disorder, and it may look like truth to those that only have the half of it, but half a truth is only a lie and a fiction. These fictions the Typhonians seek to uphold (with thier reason no less!) - and little wonder that their temple caves in on itself like a house that has mocked the need for a roof and 4 walls built carefully and it's builders instead groap in the dark for straws in it's fear.
Review the lesson of the big bad wolf (Anubis) - for he shall huff, and he shall puff, and then... he will blow your mockery of a house down.
In the Greek mysteries - the two Merti translate to Nemisis riding hard on the heels of Themis (divine Law), for All transgressor.
-----------------------------
* I leave Crowley to explain how this pertain in this Aeon: In Liber B - vel Magi :
By a Magus is this writing made known through the
mind of a Magister. The one uttereth clearly, and the other
understandeth; yet the Word is falsehood, and the
Understanding darkness. And this saying is Of All Truth.
[His note affixed reads] - All is Maya. Even above the abyss the triad is only perfect insofar as it is found in One. Seperately Chokmah and Binah are partial. They need Kether.
** Please review 'The 3 aspects of Da'ath for how this pertains to this Aeon.' |
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Post subject:
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 09:51 PM
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Greetings!
Los wrote: › No, "knowledge" is a rational extrapolation from evidence. Experience can comprise evidence, but we cannot equate experience to knowledge.
For example, I can have the experience of seeing a magician pull a rabbit out of a hat, but I can also know that I'm observing an illusion being performed for my entertainment. Furthermore, I can have the experience of a dream (or a scrying session or something) and know that the experience was generated entirely by my mind and that the entities I saw (whether dream cats or spooky demons) don't exist outside of my mind.
Experience is part of the evidence we take into account when coming to rational conclusions (knowledge) about something. It should be obvious that a personal experience of voices in the head is not evidence of god talking to you. Experience, all by itself, does not yield knowledge. Experience always has to be interpreted by the reason -- which is why ignoring reason can lead you to make rational mistakes, and come to false conclusions like, "My experience proves that reincarnation is real."
Just to be clear, "know" doesn't mean "100% absolutely certain with no chance of error." Knowledge is always tentative, based on the best evidence we have. As we gain more evidence, we refine our knowledge.
Los wrote: › We don't acquire knowledge by working from dictionaries and proceeding from definitions. We label parts of our experience -- that's what knowledge is, at its most basic level.
In the case of the rabbit being pulled out of a hat:
You experience this fact –your eyes watch the magician actually pulling the rabbit from its ears out of the hat- and, at the same time, you remember another experience of yours, where you watched the actual way of doing this trick. Then you can say you know.
If you had just heard from a friend that it’s a trick, but didn’t have the chance to watch a demonstration yourself, you would still avoid being fooled, but your mind would be puzzled because it wouldn’t understand how it can happen. In this latest case, you wouldn’t be based upon your own experience or knowledge, but rather on the good faith on your friend’s account.
In this context, would one be wrong to say that knowledge is based on experience? And further than that, would one be wrong to suppose that knowledge is the result of the apperception of our sensory organs?
Regards
Hecate |
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Post subject:
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 10:15 PM
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"In this context, would one be wrong to say that knowledge is based on experience? And further than that, would one be wrong to suppose that knowledge is the result of the apperception of our sensory organs?"
I want to turn your experience around Hecate. I want to ask - what of the person that routinely see's through the rabbit in the hat type tricks and the illusions? There are such people, but they just experience sensory data in a different way - processing it through a different part of the brain. Their 'knowledge' is based upon sensory experience too.
Isn't - to 'know thyself' therefore to test your sensory limits to apprehend external truth?
And after that - isn't 'to know thyself' an internal investigation that goes beyond the self referential question of 'who we are'? |
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Post subject: Re: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 10:23 PM
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Ian,
ianrons wrote: › I think these “demonstrations” are pretty close to being appeals to gut instinct.
Albert Einstein famously said in a letter to Max Born:
"Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does not really bring us any closer to the secret of the 'old one'. I, at any rate, am convinced that He does not throw dice."
Now, we do not yet have the much-vaunted "theory of everything", and so we do not know if quantum mechanics "bring[s] us any closer to the secret of the 'old one'", but the point here is that Einstein rejected the idea not because he had evidence against it, but because he didn't like it. His "inner voice" rejected it; he refused to accept as a matter of policy that the universe could be based upon such a principle.
I bring this up because it's exactly what you appear to be doing, here, and exactly what you appear to have repeatedly done in respect to this subject. You've made a number of comparisons to "gut instinct", "truthiness", and "does one just 'know'" that appear to indicate that you reject the real-world phenomenon of knowledge because you just don't like it, as if it isn't precise enough for you, and as if knowledge should be something "more" than that. But, as with Einstein's mistake, it's not a question that can be determined by mere feeling, but by evidence.
Knowledge, in the real world, is not a precise thing. An infant does not learn what a cat is as a result of a formal logical extrapolation from axioms. It just doesn't, if for no other reason than it's too young to even have a conception of logic. People do not learn their first language by reading a dictionary and defining words in terms of other words. They don't do it. Whether or not you think "knowledge" should be a precise thing that should answer questions about "what a cat actually is", it just isn't. Your objection here is not a rebuttal; it's merely an expression of personal disapproval, and the universe is under no obligation to act in the manner that you think it should.
To anticipate, if you argue that "we have a chain of links that...lead us to the conclusion that we don’t really know what a cat is, and moreover that we can’t possibly know what a cat (or indeed anything) is" - which you do - then this leaves you with two options. Either:
1. You accept and admit that you, Ian Rons, personally, do not know what anything is. That is to say, you accept and admit that you, Ian Rons, personally, do not know your own name, you do not know where you live, you do not know what a cat is, you do not know who the current prime minister of Great Britain is, you do not know what a dictionary is, you do not know what a web site is, and that you do not know a vast, long list of other things which just about everybody else on the planet does know.
or:
2. You accept that your "chain of links" does not "lead us to the conclusion that...we can't possibly know what a cat (or indeed anything) is" at all.
As I've already explained, even if you go with option 1, your argument still fails, because in order to assert that you don't know anything, you have to know something, such as knowing what the word "know" means, and what the word "something" means, and that you do not know anything, as some obvious examples.
There is a very simple and obvious point which you have not yet grasped, and which at least one other person on this very forum has grasped without any difficulty. It is not a point which is beyond your intellectual capacity to grasp. As I suggest above, I don't think you are failing to grasp it as much as you are refusing to grasp it, but you must grasp it if you are to have any hope of engaging with these ideas.
You say this:
"what happens if we do question what a cat actually is? We run into difficulties quite soon. "
There's the problem right there. You can make a statement such as "I know the sky is blue" without there being any metaphysical implications about the "ultimate nature" of sky or the "ultimate nature" of blueness. As I said in the other thread, you appear to want to suggest that any meaningful statement consists of an effectively infinite chain of support back to some ultimate essence, but the fact is that actual statements people make do not consist of that.
Similarly, you can make a meaningful statement such as "I know that is a cat" without there being any metaphysical assertions on the subject of "what a cat really is" being inherent in that statement, and when people do say things like that, the vast majority of the time they are, in fact, not making any such metaphysical assertions. A statement of knowledge does not have to go arbitrarily deep in order to have meaning, and in order to qualify as knowledge. If you accept that you do know things, then you have demonstrated to yourself that even you do not use the word "know" to imply such a chain of metaphysical assertions.
Therefore, as a point of principle, you cannot attack the idea that "we know what a cat is" by appealing to "what happens if we do question what a cat actually is?", because no assertion as to "what a cat actually is" is inherent in the original statement, either implied or explicit.
You say that: "You might say that a cat is a mammal. So what is a mammal? An animal. Part of the universe. But what is the universe? By enquiring in this way, we run out of generalizations." But, when people say that "a cat is a mammal", they are not, in fact, making any assertions as to the nature of the universe, so any inability to say "what the universe is" is irrelevant to the truth of that original statement. You can say that you know what a cat is, and that knowledge will still be knowledge whether or not there is even a physical universe at all, because that statement simply does not rely on what the nature of the universe might be, or even whether there is a universe.
What is happening here is that you are insisting on a definition of "knowledge" that requires such metaphysical assertions in order to be valid, and you are going on to reason that, since we cannot demonstrate that assertion, we therefore do not have knowledge. The fundamental mistake you are making is that real-world knowledge does not either arise from or contain such a stack of assertions, so any attempt to attack real-world knowledge on this basis fails, as a matter of principle.
So here's the problem: You are mistakenly attempting to attack the concept of "knowledge" which is used in the real world by attacking a concept of "knowledge" which does not coincide with that real world usage. As I said in the other thread, this is a gigantic red herring, and the straw man argument to end all straw man arguments.
In order to grasp what I am saying, and in order to grasp what other people have grasped, you need to drop your insistence that "knowledge" must mean what you want it to mean, and instead focus on the actual knowledge that exists in the real world. You are attempting to attack real world knowledge by attacking an imaginary notion of knowledge, and this approach is not going to work. If it helps you, try to think about real world knowledge as a biological phenomenon rather than a philosophical one. It also may help you to reflect that to know something, and to know that you know it, are two very different things.
ianrons wrote: › I should note also that Erwin does state clearly his belief that reason is reliable, such as when commenting on his belief that Gödel “affirms the reliability of reason”
Again, you are here demonstrating a curious tendency to egregiously misread simple sentences. You say that "Erwin does state clearly his belief that reason is reliable", but then you attempt to support that by paraphrasing what I actually did say, which is that Godel "affirms the reliability of reason", something completely different. What I actually said was "The theorem affirms the reliability of reason; if it did not, it would not be a 'proof'." That is to say, you cannot use a formal rational proof to conclude that reason is not reliable, because if you do then you've invalidated your own proof.
Now, as it happens, I do think that reason is reliable, but it's got nothing to do with Godel. Rather, it's because the application of reason has enabled us to make vast strides in both understanding and dealing with the universe, in a way that woolly faith-based thinking never did, and never could.
ianrons wrote: › so more generally there does seem to be a real problem with refusing certain types of reasoning, such as the argument against knowledge
Here you are just mistakenly conflating "reason" and "knowledge". Reason is a process. Knowledge is, in part, something that can be arrived at as a result of reasoning from facts. There is no "real problem with refusing certain types of reasoning" at all. The problem is that if you reason, entirely legitimately, off the back of a complete fantasy, then that reasoning will not - and cannot - tell you anything about the world, and it cannot give you knowledge of anything real. It doesn't matter how reliable the process of reason is - if you apply it to false facts, you're going to get false facts coming out of the other side, too. More particularly, you can't reach any conclusions about one subject by reasoning, however rigorously, about a completely different one.
Your objection here again illustrates your failure to grasp the fundamental objection that has been raised. I don't have any problem with people engaging in the type of epistemological investigations that you have talked about. What I do object to is the false belief that you are going to discover anything about real world knowledge by doing that. If you start with a definition of "knowledge" which is at odds with actual knowledge - such as a definition which requires knowledge to consist of an unbroken chain of reasoning all the way down to "what the universe really is" - then it simply doesn't matter how much rigorous and legitimate reason you apply to that; it's not going to tell you anything about real world knowledge, because that's simply not what you are reasoning about. Again, please try to put your personal disapproval of the concept aside and try to grasp this fundamental objection, because without such a grasp you're never going to be able to successfully engage with these ideas, whether or not you end up agreeing with them, and your attempted criticisms of them are going to continue to be misdirected. |
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Post subject:
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 10:43 PM
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Greetings!
alrah wrote: › I want to turn your experience around Hecate. I want to ask - what of the person that routinely see's through the rabbit in the hat type tricks and the illusions? There are such people, but they just experience sensory data in a different way - processing it through a different part of the brain. Their 'knowledge' is based upon sensory experience too.
Isn't - to 'know thyself' therefore to test your sensory limits to apprehend external truth?
And after that - isn't 'to know thyself' an internal investigation that goes beyond the self referential question of 'who we are'?
I believe this too alrah.
On the other hand, I’m willing to see the opposite side as well and, sincerely, I think it will be a nice experience to follow the train of thoughts Los wishes to show us, step by step.
I love the adventures to unknown territories and this is a great opportunity for me to explore Reason. 
Regards
Hecate |
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Post subject:
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 10:58 PM
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Hecate wrote: › Greetings!
alrah wrote: › I want to turn your experience around Hecate. I want to ask - what of the person that routinely see's through the rabbit in the hat type tricks and the illusions? There are such people, but they just experience sensory data in a different way - processing it through a different part of the brain. Their 'knowledge' is based upon sensory experience too.
Isn't - to 'know thyself' therefore to test your sensory limits to apprehend external truth?
And after that - isn't 'to know thyself' an internal investigation that goes beyond the self referential question of 'who we are'?
I believe this too alrah.
On the other hand, I’m willing to see the opposite side as well and, sincerely, I think it will be a nice experience to follow the train of thoughts Los wishes to show us, step by step.
I love the adventures to unknown territories and this is a great opportunity for me to explore Reason.
Regards
Hecate
'Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance' is rather good - especially if you ride too?  |
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Form is the mind's abacus - Dar es Alrah.
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Post subject: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 11:07 PM
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Los wrote: › There is. And that trap, as clearly explained in the Book of the Law -- as others have pointed out -- is that reason should not be used to discover the will. However, the Book of the Law does *not* ever say that reason should not be used to come to conclusions about the universe.
93,
I agree with you here but I think that if you look at the definitions of Chokmah, Daath and Binah some of their attributes will certainly fall into reaso.
Binah being understanding, Chokmah knowledge and Daath a "warped mirror" which one won't be considered as reason?
Actually you can consider all the Sephiroth as being part of reason but probably you are already missing many details.
There are alternatives to the Qabalistic structure but what I guess is that people will start to talk about different things using the same name without a clear reference about the ideas they are using.
It isn't very hard to guess that eventually this thread will be locked (just my bet).
Best regards, |
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Be thou therefore prompt and active as the Sylphs, but avoid frivolity and caprice; be energetic and strong like the Salamanders, but avoid irritability and ferocity; be flexible and attentive to images like the Undines, but avoid idleness and changeabili
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Post subject: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 11:23 PM
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Erwin,
I don't have time this evening to write a reply to your post, but I note that you have not addressed the central arguments as set forth in my penultimate paragraph. In order to save time, so that I can write a consolidated reply tomorrow, may I refer you again to that paragraph? |
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Post subject: Re: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 11:37 PM
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ianrons wrote: › Erwin,
I don't have time this evening to write a reply to your post, but I note that you have not addressed the central arguments as set forth in my penultimate paragraph. In order to save time, so that I can write a consolidated reply tomorrow, may I refer you again to that paragraph?
I would also appreciate a reply from you both. I think you both understood what I said in my first post to this thread. |
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Post subject: RE: Re: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 18, 2010 - 11:55 PM
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alrah,
I don't really disagree with you re: Grant, but at the moment I would prefer to concentrate on the issues raised by Los, so I'll take a rain check. |
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Post subject: Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 19, 2010 - 12:03 AM
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ianrons wrote: › alrah,
I don't really disagree with you re: Grant, but at the moment I would prefer to concentrate on the issues raised by Los, so I'll take a rain check.
OK - np - I'm just another star (like you). |
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Post subject: Re: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 19, 2010 - 12:28 AM
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ianrons wrote: › I don't have time this evening to write a reply to your post, but I note that you have not addressed the central arguments as set forth in my penultimate paragraph.
Well, I already have, but I'm happy to reiterate myself in response to that paragraph, point-by-point. To be scrupulously fair, one of the points I will reiterate was not made recently, but way back in the Go-go-Godel thread, so you can be forgiven for not being able to immediately recall it to mind.
ianrons wrote: › But that’s if you use reason to analyse what knowledge-of-a-cat is.
No - that's what happens if you use reason to analyse what "knowledge-which-requires-an-unbroken-chain-of-metaphysical-assertions-all-the-way-down-to-the-ultimate-nature-of-the-universe-of-a-cat" is.
When you analyse the actual knowledge-of-a-cat that people really do have have - which is not the same kind of knowledge you were talking about in the above-quoted sentence - that isn't what happens at all. What happens in that case is that you come to the conclusion that I've been repeatedly stating here.
ianrons wrote: › Erwin forbids it, apparently seeking refuge from his intellect.
No, I don't "forbid" it. You have this idea that I am somehow opposed to applying reason to the idea of knowledge. The very fact that I am here on this forum having this conversation with you, reasoning about the idea of knowledge, should fairly convincingly demonstrate to you that I am not.
What I do object to is the application of reason to a conception of "knowledge" which is demonstrably at odds with real-world knowledge, and then attempting to use the fruits of that application to draw conclusions about that real-world knowledge. It's not the application of reason that I object to - I merely require that you apply reason to the same object you wish to draw conclusions over, and that isn't what you're doing.
ianrons wrote: › However, there is a problem. In his “demonstration” that we can know what a cat is, even this process of fitting the photograph of a cat into a general idea of “cat” is a process of the intellect. Sometimes it is imperceptible, but there can also be occasions when one struggles to identify a face, showing us that something is taking place in the mind to allow us to make that identification. Is this some type of reason, of the type used in philosophy (he describes it as “loosely rational”)?
Whoa there, cowboy. Let's break that last sentence up.
Firstly, is this "some type of reason"? I would say it is "some type", yes. It's not the formally logical type of reason, but as I've repeatedly said, reason is a significantly larger concept than logic. The human mind/body appears to have some inbuilt evolved faculty for drawing associations and whatnot, otherwise infants wouldn't be able to learn. Although I'm no biologist, and it's not a germane point to the argument, I'd suggest that the human faculty of reason is a developed form of this inbuilt faculty. So, yes, I have no problem describing it as "some type of reason", and that would indeed be an example of what I mean by "loosely rational", since it is based on consistent extrapolation from evidence, no matter how primitive.
It is reason "of the type used in philosophy", though? Probably not, but as I've repeatedly said, I'm not having a philosophical discussion here. It is the type of reason that I have consistently defined as "the mental power concerned with forming conclusions, judgments, or inferences" way back in the Go-go-Godel thread. In other words, I employ the word "reason" in a completely conventional dictionary-definition way which is consonant with how the word is actually used in the English language, with little concern for any alternative definitions philosophers might like to argue about.
ianrons wrote: › I would argue that both are functions of the mind, even if differing slightly in what regions of the brain are used.
I would also argue that "both are functions of the mind", not least on account of having defined "reason" as "the mental power concerned with forming conclusions, judgments, or inferences". I'm honestly a little mystified as to how anyone could argue they are anything else.
ianrons wrote: › Perhaps he regards the faculty that identifies photos as superior to other types of (presumably “stricter”) reason; but on what grounds?
Presumably you are suggesting this because of the implication that I "forbid....using reason to analyse what knowledge-of-a-cat is". Since I've explained above that this is a false implication, no response to this point is necessary.
ianrons wrote: › He doesn’t seem to offer any,
As per previous response, since this is based on a false implication, no response is necessary. The process of reason and its superiority or inferiority to any other process is most emphatically not the issue. The issue is the object to which you apply that process.
ianrons wrote: › and in fact in one of his essays he asks the reader who doesn’t simply accept his “demonstration” to stop reading.
And I wholeheartedly stand by my position that anybody who doesn't know that 2 + 2 = 4 does not have the intellectual capacity to understand what I write, and would be well advised to refrain from trying to read it.
ianrons wrote: › I find this approach highly anti-intellectual,
1. If "this approach" refers to the false implication that I "forbid....using reason to analyse what knowledge-of-a-cat is" then again, no response is necessary, since it is indeed a false implication.
2. If "this approach" refers to advising anyone who doesn't know that 2 + 2 = 4 may want to quit reading my essays, then I'm mystified how anyone could characterise that as "anti-intellectual". Quite the opposite, in fact.
ianrons wrote: › (certainly anti-philosophical)
Again, I've repeatedly said that I am not having a philosophical discussion, and that the root cause of the widespread confusion within the occult community that I am describing is a direct result of people thoroughly confusing themselves with philosophy, so I have no objection to this.
ianrons wrote: › and I would say not that “[‘true knowledge’ is] an entirely imaginary concept which philosophers have invented”,
Well, I would say it is, for the reasons I've given, and for the overriding reason that if it's the kind of knowledge that nobody has - which is what you have yourself claimed - then using the word "true" for it is at the very least exceedingly strange, and more correctly described as enormously misleading. As I said in the other thread, if you're talking about a type of knowledge which you freely admit that nobody has, then "false knowledge" - or "imaginary knowledge" if you prefer - is a much better term for it than "true knowledge".
ianrons wrote: › but rather that this sort of “knowledge” is nothing more than a convenient fiction,
The "true knowledge" of which you speak is the fiction. What I'm talking about is a concept which derives from observation of the real world.
ianrons wrote: › and a self-contradictory one.
Presuming that you now finally are able to identify the actual type of "knowledge" that I am talking about, you should be able to either resolve any contradictions you saw, or demonstrate why you think it is "self-contradictory".
I trust my response addresses the central points in your penultimate paragraph to your satisfaction. |
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Erwin |
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Post subject: Re: RE: Re: Crowley on Knowledge
Posted: Mar 19, 2010 - 12:34 AM
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Joined: Feb 15, 2007
Posts: 814
Status: Offline
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alrah wrote: › I would also appreciate a reply from you both. I think you both understood what I said in my first post to this thread.
I'm not sure your first post to this thread was either coherent or substantial enough as to make a sensible "reply" even possible. It's certainly not coherent or substantial enough for me to take the time to write one. If you have a specific question you'd like me to address then restate it in a simple and concise manner. |
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